It Just Makes Sense

Five percent attrition of a fleet is serious degradation, especially when it happens in one day.  It sounds like something that would happen to a military force after a hard-fought battle.  Its like losing 64 F-16s, or 26 KC-135s, or 4 B-52s.  What is was, was a single B-2.

It’s too early for us to know why the aircraft crashed shortly after take-off in Guam this weekend, but we do know that the two pilots survived the ejection.  One pilot is still hospitalized with the customary spinal-compression injury.  Ejection is a terribly violent experience.  Somebody must have been praying for them.

Smart pilots honor the potential danger of their ejection seats.  Honor is a bit like fear.  Nobody really wants to eject, the idea of it is scary.  Typically a pilot knows it is time to “bail-out” when his fear of staying in the aircraft exceeds his fear of ejecting.  So what caused the fear?

It might have been a fire, but we’ll know for sure later.

The Air Force is performing a professional investigation, after which it will reveal all those details to those who need to know.  Ultimately that information will be used to make the B-2 a better weapon system.

Somebody once said, “That which doesn’t kill us, only makes us stronger.”  Losing five percent of a fleet doesn’t sound like we’re getting stronger.

The price-tag of the advanced technology jet has brought some attention to this crash, but the question of how much the loss of one aircraft from a small fleet degrades the overall force hasn’t been addressed. The B-2 has been around for 20 years, and this is the first crash.  Not a bad record, but we only made 21 of them.  In comparison, over 700 B-52s were built.  Of course, things were different then.

It’s like supply and demand.  The fewer of something you have, the more it’s worth.  And we’re not going to make any more of the bat-winged bombers. So now each Spirit is worth even more, at least when it comes to accomplishing the mission.

The Global War on Terrorism has demonstrated that the freedom forces need heavy bombers.  The F-22 fleet’s size gets plenty of attention, as does the F-35’s.  While those jets have great promise for what they  are designed to do, they’re not heavy bombers.  The bomber roadmap needs to consider our peacetime attrition.  It is overly optimistic to plan on no losses.  Even the best Air Force in the world occasionally loses one.

Above all, we need to plan for that when we build all of our air fleets.

It just makes sense.

It can be argued as to when the terrorists began their war against the world. It was certainly before the suicide-terrorist attacks of 9/11. Some say it began in 1983 Lebanon with the horrific suicide-terrorist attack on our Marine barracks, others say it began in 1979 Tehran with the unlawful invasion and seizure of the US Embassy. Some historians argue that it was much earlier during the Crusades of the 11th century or even at the beginning of the Muslim invasions of their neighbors dating back to the 7th and 8th centuries. Regardless of when the terrorists began their war against the rest of the world, the United States began fighting with a purpose after 9/11.

Our President called it the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).   He established objectives that were refined and spelled out in the 2006 publication National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, also known as the NMSP-WOT:

1. Deny terrorists the resources they need to operate and survive
2. Enable partner nations to counter terrorism.
3. Deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and increase capacity for consequence management.
4. Defeat terrorists and their organizations.
5. Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations
6. Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism.

The NMSP-WOT identifies the enemy as “extremists.”  The extremists oppose the right of people to live as they chose and they support the murder of ordinary people to advance their ideology.  Moderates or mainstreams are the folks who don’t support the extremists and oppose the killing of ordinary people.  Finally, terrorists are those who conduct acts of terrorism.  It goes on to stress that this is not a war between Islam and the West and then refers to some of the extremist organizations in the transnational movement responsible for the terrorism.

It even spells out an end state, sometimes referred to a better-state-of-peace:

“The national strategic aims are to defeat violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society; and create a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them.”

Victory is achieved only after those aims are met.

In 2006, Mitt Romney referred to the enemy as “jihadists” suggesting more than extreme behavior, but also extreme belief. His web site declared that victory will be achieve through a combination of American resolve, international effort, and the rejection of violence by moderate, modern, mainstream Muslims. He stressed that we need to support modern Muslim nations both militarily and diplomatically.

While the NMSP-WOT spells out a theoretic strategy that appears sound, the practice of the GWOT appears to be more of a war of attrition.  We seem to have so limited the definitions of the enemy that our fielded forces invest most of their time killing individuals, occasionally capturing or killing one of the ring-leaders and confusing that with strategic success.

Strategic effects are those that have far-reaching consequences with a cascading effect that result in paralysis of the enemy.  Killing foot soldiers, even a few of their regional leaders is not strategic if there is a continual supply of replacements.  The surge’s success in the Iraqi Theater of the GWOT worked well towards satisfying GWOT objectives 2 and 4.  But the results will be temporary if the terrorists/extremists/jihadists are allowed to rebuild their forces.  GWOT objectives 1, 5, and 6 are essential to achieving victory.

The seemingly endless supply of willing replacements for the attrited terrorists has to be denied.  Otherwise we will be forced to continue to kill them, one at a time, as they present themselves.  If that happens, this war of attrition could easily last the 100 years John McCain has talked about.

State and nonstate support to the terrorists has to become completely unprofitable.  Leaders must be convinced they will face the same consequences as Saddam Hussein and the former leaders of Afghanistan before they will alter their policies.  And ultimately, a counter ideology has to be established before victory can be won.

Shortly after 9/11, columnist Ann Coulter wrote the politically incorrect statement that we should, “invade their countries, kill their leaders, and convert them to Christianity.” That statement generated a lot of criticism for her as it ironically blended the horrors of 9/11 with harsh Western humor and pointed out the realization that Western religious tolerance, which is sometimes credited with making us strong, may be our greatest weakness. Conversion to Christianity has always been by the word, not by the sword.

Since we obviously lack the national resolve to execute Ms Coulter’s suggestion, we must develop a different strategic course of action that renders terrorism equally unacceptable to the present supporters and future recruits of the violent extremists.

It just makes sense.

Defending a nation has always required the service of strong people who often traded their health, limbs, and sometimes their lives so that the other citizens could sleep safely in their beds at night. In first century Rome it was not much different leaving substantial numbers of disabled veterans depended on the state for small pensions that sustained their modest lifestyles.

Then there was Caligula, the infamous Roman Emperor noted for his unquenchable desires, who decided to entertain the people by clubbing hundreds of disabled veterans to death in the Coliseum.  His joy was two-fold, while pretending to be a warrior the spindly sovereign helped balance his national budget by eliminating some fixed costs. Such behavior is repugnant to any observer of history who possesses even a modicum of humanity.

Today, the United States is fighting a global war, another way of saying world war, against an enemy who wants to disrupt the sleep of our citizens. The strong people who stand watch and do violence as required on this enemy often trade their health, limbs, and sometimes their lives for us.  Caring for those that survive the ordeal of service requires a cost.  Modern health care is more expensive than it was in 1st century Rome, but our longevity and quality of life is greater too.

So far, no one has suggested murdering our veterans to balance the defense budget, but other things are being done to them that endanger their health.  Just a few years ago a system called Tricare replaced a system without an annual fee.  At the time, some argued that it reneged on the promises of the past, but the argument was brushed aside because the fees were smaller than most civilian plans.  Those fees were designed to offset some of the cost of health care by collecting money from the veterans.  The resistance faded and the system went into effect.

Soon it was argued that having smaller fees for Tricare than for plans like Blue Cross, encouraged retirees to actually use the program resulting in a high cost to the defense budget.  Some proposed modifications to Tricare appeared to be designed to force retirees to abandon Tricare altogether and to seek healthcare elsewhere.  While it is not quite as horrible as Caligula’s clubbing of Rome’s veterans in the Coliseum, it is still a shame that the past service of our 20 to 30+ year veterans is not being held in high esteem.

The bean-counters in the Pentagon aren’t completely to blame.  All of us who served during the 80s and 90s experienced shrinking or eliminated entitlements.  Self-help was the mantra of how to get things done.  Costs were “transferred” from the budget to money acquired through fund-raisers or squadron dues.  And now when the budget spinners talk about “increasing revenues” they really mean collecting money from retirees’ pensions.

Balancing the defense budget on the wallets of retirees is repugnant.  Congress should fully fund military health care to stop the Pentagon budget planners from continually searching for ways to loot retirees of their hard-earned pensions.

It just makes sense.

The air and space operations center (AOC) is a weapon system.  We’ve heard it said so many times lately that it generally goes without intellectual challenge.  But maybe we should make sure that we understand what a weapon system is before much more energy goes into this concept.

It’s difficult to find a standard definition for the term “weapon system”.

The on-line DOD dictionary provides the Joint definition: “A combination of one or more weapons with all related equipment, materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable) required for self-sufficiency.”  The same dictionary doesn’t define “weapon” so it might leave a person with some questions as to how the Air Force is using the term.  Is a command center a weapon?  Is an airplane a weapon?  What is a weapon?

While the Army publication “United States Army Weapon Systems” doesn’t define the term, it does list about 129 things that it declares to be weapon systems ranging from rockets, aircraft, and vehicles to an aircrew ensemble, and even a tactical operations center (TOC).  The broad-brush approach the Army uses with the term seems to mean it is anything that can be or is used by a soldier to do a job.  Certainly an AOC falls into that definition.

But what does the Air Force mean when it uses the term?  While “weapon system” is not defined in Air Force doctrine, it has been used by airmen for decades.  I can’t find it written anywhere, but we use it as a synonym for airplane.

However, by saying weapons system, we distinguished it from the manufacturer’s product with the understanding that the airplane was an essential part of a system which had dedicated operators, support folks, processes, procedures, and roles that all came together to support the fly, fight, and win mission of the Air Force.  Being associated with a weapon system has always meant that your career would follow a certain geographical/functional track until such time as you separated, retired, or administratively removed that association.  It defined your purpose as an airman.

So what’s wrong with that?

Nothing, if we keep our heads about us.  We know, the Air Force has a history of standardizing our weapon systems.  The manufacturer standardizes the airframe, but if the rest of it went freestyle there would be no interoperability between like units and thus efficiency would be lost.  We want a B-52 stationed in Minot to organize and train pretty much the same way a B-52 stationed at Barksdale does.  The same idea applies to all the other “weapon systems” in the Air Force, from C-17 to F-22.

Of course that only applies within a weapon system.  No airman would ever think of trying to force F-22s to be standardized with B-52 processes, roles, and procedures:  stuffing five crewmembers into the cockpit of an F-22 would be ludicrous; loading it with 200,000 pounds of jet fuel would be dangerous and impossible; not using the capabilities of the F-22 to fly, fight, and win against our enemies would be criminal.  That’s probably why the Air Force doesn’t refer to a base or wing as a weapon system.  All bases, like all wings are not alike.  They’re different.

What about AOCs?  Are they more like airplanes or airbases?

When Lockheed Martin Corp was awarded the contract to serve as the AOC Weapon System Integrator, the press release referred to 23 AOC sites:  five Falconer AOCs for theater operations; four “tailored” Falconer AOCs for homeland and strategic defense; two functional AOCs for space and mobility; and 12 AOC support functions for integration/testing/assessment, technical support, training, backup, and augmentation.  If in the process of “standardizing” all these AOCs, the Air Force attempts to make them one-size-fits-all, we’ll be taking a process that needed some work and turning it into one that might not work at all.

General Keys once said, “The AOC is fundamental to what makes us great as an Air Force.  If you have a group of airplanes but you don’t have an AOC, you don’t really have an air force, you have a flying club.”  We can’t mess up the AOC and expect to remain great.

The Air Force has made great strides towards correcting many of the problems that General Keys addressed back in 2003, proper training and management of resources.  With a formal training unit in place, AOC personnel now attend centralized initial qualification training and move to their respective AOC to attain their combat mission ready status through their unit training programs.  The AOCs are now working better than ever.

When it comes to standardizing the AOCs, maybe the airman’s view should be that AOC is like a base and the software is the weapon system.  After all, if bombers are tasked to disrupt, destroy, or degrade our enemy, airmen assigned to bases operate weapon systems to generate desired effects.  Likewise when an AOC is tasked to accomplish something, airmen operate software to generate effects.  Viewing software as a weapon system requires us to use a cyberspace perspective in relating the company that produces the software to an aerospace company that makes aircraft; the personnel that operate the software to aircrews that fly airplanes; and the personnel that support the platforms that enable the software to the entire support structure behind the success of our airplanes.

If software is considered the “weapon” in the DOD definition of a weapon system, the airman’s traditional paradigm of being tied to a weapon system becomes easier to grasp.  Using this cyberspace perspective may be the key to avoiding inflexible design in regards to which capabilities can be added to an AOC’s inventory.  If so, then the goal of organizing AOCs for useful data exchange through focused connectivity and interoperability would remain the challenge.  The AOC should be viewed more like a base is viewed.While some Air Force bases are very similar, each base is a little different from the others. Nevertheless, all the units assigned to each base must cooperate within certain parameters to meet the objectives of that base. It is through the diversity of complimentary capabilities throughout the world-wide network of bases that the Air Force is able to remain the nation’s primary air and space power.

It just makes sense.

War is one of the most serious things mankind endeavors to accomplish. The process of killing people and breaking things can get so complicated, which is precisely why we should be careful when we use simple names to label them.

Take the “Civil War,” there was nothing civil about the entire event. Americans killed each other in record numbers, half the country was laid to waste, and it created an embitterment that is sometimes felt in our debates over 146 years after it ended. For it did end.

What if we had chosen to call it the War in South Carolina? After all, that is where the fighting at Fort Sumter is supposed to have started the war back in 1861. Since federal troops are still stationed in South Carolina, would there be anyone demanding we end the war and bring the troops home? I’d like to think not, but maybe the only reason is because they were smart enough not to call it the War in South Carolina.

So what is this War in Iraq? Does that refer to what is sometimes called the First Persian Gulf War? No, that was a different war in Iraq from the early 90’s, which continued via Operations Southern and Northern Watch until 2003, when the new war in Iraq began. That sounds a little confusing, even though some smart people started off calling it Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF). What was OIF all about?

Regime change. Remember?

According to Clausewitzian theory, OIF was a total war against Iraq. The only thing more serious than a total war is a war of annihilation, where the goal is to kill the entire population of the target country. A total war is a war where the objective is to completely remove the existing government of the target country, which happens to be what was done—regime change. Saddam’s military was defeated and scattered; he and his government went into panic hiding; he was found, arrested, tried, and executed; a new government process was created, and democratic elections were accomplished. If that’s not “mission accomplished” for OIF nothing can be.

Nevertheless we keep hearing about the war in Iraq, as if we were still fighting the 2003 OIF. So what is really happening there?

Iraq is a willing and increasingly able ally in the US-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and those who are on the terrorists’ side are concerned about what a strong united Iraq will mean to their cause. We can only understand the terrorists’ plans for us only if we can remember 9/11.

Annihilation. Remember?

How the current administration allowed the anti-war crowd to keep using “The War in Iraq” as a rallying point defies political logic. The US-led effort is fighting the terrorists in Iraq, just as we fight them in Afghanistan, and myriad other places at home and abroad—that’s why the word “Global” is in the name. They are all part of the same war being fought in multiple theaters around the globe.

We’re calling it by the wrong name. It should be called the “Iraqi Theater of the GWOT” or the “GWOT in Iraq” because that is what it is.

It just makes sense.

“Hold the flashlight while I shoot myself in the other foot, Nellie.”    “You know, Clem, I was thinking … this didn’t turn out so well last time; maybe there’s a better way.  At least wait till the sun comes up.”

“Just shut-up and watch.  I’ve got a lot of experience doing this.”

“Those who refuse to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”

The Air Force has a history of feast and famine when it comes to maintaining enough pilots to do its job.  The solution to feast and famine problems can be gleaned from Genesis 41:33-36; it’s basically to save some of the surplus during the feast to get you through the famine.  Why is it so difficult for the Air Force to put that principle into practice?

In 1975, the Air Force took drastic action to clear out its post-Vietnam feast of pilots.  During that reduction in force, officers with more than 10 years in service were offered the opportunity to complete their retirement requirements as an enlisted person or to leave the service.  Captains could start at the rank of sergeant (E-4) and majors were offered staff sergeant.  The specialty knowledge tests were waived for the first year, enabling most of them to advance to another grade within the first cycle.  Many pilots just left the service to do other things.  During that same time, military pay raises lagged woefully behind inflation rates.  Then the airlines deregulated in 1979, and something completely unplanned for happened–people got out, lots of them, and many of them were pilots.  Feast turned to famine in four short years, and the Air Force was 2300 pilots short of operational requirements.

The solution chosen was to surge the number of officers attending undergraduate pilot training (UPT).  The pool of eligible candidates was increased by relaxing stringent educational requirements.  The five UPT bases pumped double-shift classes for a couple of years with great success even though attrition was a bit higher than normal, probably because graduation standards remained constant.  The process proved that pilots don’t need an engineering degree to be good at the stick and rudder; of course earlier practice had already proven that.  And it worked for me, as I was career-NCO with a BS in Occupational Education about to leave the service in search of a vocation that didn’t require supplemental food-stamps to feed my family.

The surge created what was later called a bubble when personnel charts were viewed; it showed up as a huge anomaly for the 1980-82 year groups.  Slightly resembling a baby elephant being swallowed by a python, the bubble eventually slowed and then denied promotions to many pilots due to excessive numbers of people reaching their critical career points at the same time.  Officer promotions come at a certain time, and you either make it or you don’t.  With only rare exceptions, regardless of potential or ability, an officer twice passed over is done with promotions.

Another famine presented itself in 1988-89.  This coincided with the age-directed retirement of many commercial airline pilots and with many officers completing their initial UPT commitments.  The solution this time was to offer unprecedented bonuses of $12,000 per year to pilots with less than 13 years total service if they would commit to seven more years, and yes, prior-enlisted time like mine counted against that total.  Ironically, some of the pilots who took the bonuses they were offered to stay were later forced to separate for failing to advance to major, and then given severance pay as they headed to the pilot-hungry airlines.  It was a blend of personnel voodoo that still defies my logic matrix.

Then in the late 1990’s another famine cycle appeared on the horizon.  The base realignment and closure process and force down-sizing, accented with eight years of deliberately reducing the military pay by 0.5% annually, while the surviving three UPT bases operated at only 55% capacity, resulted in another pilot famine that was predicted to be deeper and longer than the one in 1979.  The solution chosen was to offer $25,000 a year to pilots for extending their service commitments, to increase UPT production, and to fill only 28% of non-flying pilot positions at staff jobs.  As an unplanned consequence, this solution denied pilots many temporary jobs that historically kept them competitive for promotions.  Still enough pilots took the bonus to keep the Air Force viable as UPT surged to 100% production hoping to meet future requirements.  But now, in 2007, we are at it again.

As the Air Force looks five years into the future and suspects that it will be over-manned with pilots without a one-to-one replacement of the F-15 and F-16 with the new generation of aircraft, it seeks to prevent the forecasted feast in the future by reducing pilot training numbers now.  Are you starting to see a pattern?

The requirements for college graduates to be accepted into pilot training are quite substantial.  Common logic dictates that after pilot training, those same officers would remain qualified to be employed doing things with less stringent requirements.  Instead of having less than 19% of Air Force officers wearing pilot wings, as they do today, why not fill another 2% or more of other line officer positions with pilots on career broadening tours of duty?  If another famine suddenly arose, those pilots could be requalified in short-order.

The Rand Corp’s Project Air Force offered three options to the Air Force, let me offer two more:

1. Use the surplus initial flight training gradates in scheduling, IT, or maintenance positions in flying units across the Air Force.  While they won’t be flying, they will be exposed to the flying culture during their first assignment.  This one would work, but it is not my favorite option.

2. Cycle pilots at specific gate intervals into flying support officer positions.  If the tour was limited to two or three years, the pilots would return to their weapon system with easily renewable skills, and they will be more knowledgeable of the oft-touted big picture.  Another benefit is that flying operations would be supported by officers with a superior understanding of flight requirements.

To make option 2 work its best, the pilots who volunteer for leadership positions in support should be rewarded for it in their career.  Make it competitive, and then use their performance in those positions to help determine their leadership potential to the Air Force.  But remember to bring them back to the cockpit and get them flying again.

One last thing must be done for this to succeed–a silent prejudice must be removed from the flying community.  A pilot returning to the cockpit should not be considered to be starting over.  Pilots who serve in staff/non-flying positions should be viewed as being at least equal to pilots who serve in similar ranked flying jobs.  Thus, the Air Force needs to ensure operational squadron- and group-level commanders consider the career broadening experience as a plus to the pilot’s record and not a stain.

The Air Force can’t fly, fight, and win if it runs out of pilots, and it needs leaders who will never forget that.  It just makes sense.

The November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities has been lauded by some as proof that we have no reason to be concerned about Iran. Sadly this is far from reality. Most people will not read the NIE report, even though it is available to the public on the Director of National Intelligence’s home page and it is only nine pages long, counting the cover, instead they will rely on second hand commentary to develop their opinion. Maybe this is because, like most reports, intelligence reports are often imperfect. Interesting enough, they never claim to be perfect, only accurate based on the data available at the time. Much like a weather report, which even when backed up by the greatest technologies available in the 21st century, is better at observing than it is forecasting weather.

Did you ever have the experience of planning and then attempting an outing, maybe a picnic in the park or a softball game, based on a forecast of ”sunny skies with a slight chance of isolated showers in the afternoon” only to be drenched in a downpour as your family ran for cover? If you complained to the weather folks, they would have said, “We said there was a slight chance of rain.” After you reviewed the forecast, you would have had to admit they were correct and then might have thought that you should have carried some umbrellas with you. In retrospect, you would have been considered the hero if you had made the effort to plan for “the slight chance of rain.”  Being a hero is so difficult.

What seems like ancient history to many might shed some perspective on this. A NIE 85-3-62 “The Military Buildup in Cuba” forecasted on 19 September 1962, while the USSR could gain military advantage with ballistic missiles based in Cuba, such action would be incompatible with Soviet practice, strongly suggesting it would not happen. However, photographic evidence on 14 October provided an observation to the contrary. Forced to become reactionary, the US President publically stated his intentions to deal with the USSR in the harshest manner possible when matters escalated. To many, it appeared that nuclear warfare was imminent. Only after the USSR decision-makers repented from their nuclear Cuba plan did the high-level tensions subside.

Observations beat forecasts every time, but you can’t plan based on observations—they come too late. The forecaster needs to collect, interpret, and provide the data as his science and expertise allows. However, much like weather forecasts, intelligence reports are not everything a decision-maker relies on to make important decisions. That craft requires science and expertise also. Part of that expertise is to understand the imperfect and somewhat ambiguous nature of forecasts. Much more complicated than planning events based on weather, is planning actions based on the evolving perception of antagonist decision-makers.

Basing nuclear weapons in Cuba was probably a logical, progressive course of action for USSR decision makers if they interpreted US resolution against their world-domination objective to have faltered. What could have given them that perception? How about apparent communist successes at the Bay of Pigs, the Berlin Wall, and in Laos? These could have been interpreted as a US fear of USSR nuclear might as demonstrated by their late 1961 Tsar Bomba, declared at the time as a 100 Megaton weapon. But whatever the catalyst for the USSR’s initial motivation, their interpretation of the modified US stance against their actions and their knowledge of US military capabilities, via their well-established spy network, convinced them that a nuclear show-down over Cuba was not worth the price they perceived they would pay in return for continued aggression. Perception is everything.

So let’s take a look as the 2007 NIE about Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities. It never really says what the anti-Global War on Terrorism advocates are saying. It only gives several low to almost high confidence statements about what is probably happening. Some of the higher confident statements are that Iran halted their program in 2003 as a result of international pressure. What was the nature of that pressure?

Do you remember what was happening to Iran’s neighbors in 2003? To their east, the government of Afghanistan had already fell, and to their west, the mighty forces of Saddam were rolled over, scattered to the four winds, and the ones that wanted to continue fighting joined up with the terrorist organizations operating in their former country. Tehran did not halt their nuclear weapons program because they were seeking peaceful negotiations with the rest of the planet; they were hoping to avoid an OPERATION IRANIAN FREEDOM. The report makes the declaration, “In our judgment, only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision is inherently reversible.” That is undeniably the truest statement in the report.

Political leaders make decisions based on their perception of the most desirable outcome according to their value system. Iran is the antagonist in this international drama. When their terrorist-supporting neighbors defied the demands of a resolute US-led coalition of nations, Iran watched them experience a force-fed regime change. Iranian decision-makers might have had the perception that such a future was in store for them if they continued their nuclear weapons development program. If so, they might have discontinued it in the hope of getting some sort of multinational support via some third-party or UN inspectors once they were confident it was their turn to endure the torched-end of the US spear. But something else has happened since then.

The antagonist may have perceived some weakness in the willingness of the US to take action against Iran. The will of a nation is derived from a product of three factors: population, government, and military. While the US military boldly executed OEF and OIF and showed no wavering of dealing with other enemies if needed, the same was not necessarily true of the US population and government, at least from a totalitarian’s perception.

Antagonists can be emboldened in their plans when even lesser officials in the protagonist government express opposition. The noise coming out of Washington inspired many people to argue about the validity of the regime changes in Iraq and Afghanistan, some arguing unrelentingly, though absurdly, that the US was the terrorist and the actions were illegal. Americans mostly understand that such debate is better than giving up the constitutionally recognized right of free speech. At the same time, we have historically expected our elected leaders, even when not in control of the country, to speak more respectfully of our President and to at least stay close to the truth when they disagree with national policy. Still, we are a free nation and disagreement is certain to exist in a nation of such diversity. We deal it in our own way. But we are the United States, and our internal bickering should not be misinterpreted as disunited resolve. It is important that we understand our enemies are listening to our words as we debate.  We send a message to the world with our words.

Sometimes that message is the toughest one for antagonists to understand. That was why Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, they believed we couldn’t or wouldn’t fight back. This was why the planes flew into the towers, they believed we couldn’t or wouldn’t hunt them down. If the result of the political debate during this upcoming election-year encourages Iran’s decision-makers that we won’t or can’t inflict the most serious of consequences on them for their development and use of nuclear weapons, who are we going to blame?

Certainly, we’d have to blame ourselves some along with our enemies, but only after we do what the majority of Americans expect us to do. We’d blame ourselves in the history books for the suffering that would follow, but it hasn’t happened yet so we don’t have to do it that way.  We can do something else.

We can tip the scales of the deterrence equation back towards producing acceptable behavior from the antagonist. As it now, the voices that are really just saying, “Look at me,” by demanding we should never attack Iran based on a report that clearly explains that the report might be wrong, may very well be the catalyst that motivates the terrorists to do the very things that will force our violent response against them.

Hang on tight because as I see it now—irony rules and common sense drools—this is going to be one ugly ride, unless Americans, especially our elected officials or those seeking to be one, learn how to debate without appearing unwilling or incapable of decisive action against those who choose to be our enemy.

It just makes sense.

Recent headlines give the impression that Pakistan’s Pervez Musharraf is a bad guy who suppresses his people and disrupts the legal system of a peaceful nation.  Our state department appears to be pressuring him to relinquish his power and allow the good people of Pakistan to elect new popular rulers in a spirit of democracy.  To me, all that brings back memories of 1979, when the Jimmy Carter-led government put enough pressure on the terminally ill Shah of Iran that he surrendered power to the people in what was once our greatest ally in region, even more so that Israel was.  The bloody mess that followed needs little review to anyone much over 30.

For those younger, here it is in brief.  A global, fundamentalism movement grew out the popular rebellion in Iran.  It directly led to the deaths of thousands of Persians, Arabs, Americans, and just about every group of people who do not agree with them.  The religious foundation of the Pakistanis is quite similar to that of the folks who took power in Iran back in 1979.  One glaring difference is that Pakistan is a nuclear power.

Following 9/11, Musharraf had a choice to make.  He decided to cooperate with the United States, even though a majority of the people in his country sided with the terrorists targeted by the US for attack.  Had he gone the other way, the US would have had to resort to employing our own nuclear weapons to subdue them, because we were going to Afghanistan either way.  Musharraf saved his people from themselves, and has remained a loyal friend of the US ever since.

That is not to say the Pakistani people follow his leadership because they are our friends.  Talk to any B-52 aviator who flew missions against Afghanistan.  If you’re polite enough, they’ll tell you about the anti-aircraft fire coming at them from Pakistan positions during their ingress and egress over “friendly” territory.  Altitude is another loyal friend of the bomber crew dog.

In a civilized world, international relationships are dealt with based on the policies and decisions made by established governments, not the prevailing popular opinion of the population.  This paradigm allows for the US to wage war against governments as opposed to killing everyone who lives in a country that has provoked us to violence.  If you consider human life to be valuable, it really is a better way to solve our differences.

Traditionally the US avoids getting too involved in the inner workings between the governments and population inside their countries.  When a government crosses a certain level of unacceptable behavior, we usually respond with a combination of political, economic, or even military influence.  The most obvious recent exception to that has been China, but that is another subject, so lets get back to Musharraf.

Musharraf recently declared emergency rule in Pakistan, shut down their media, and fired the Supreme Court justices.  If we simply mirror-image those decision into our lives, it seems easy to label Musharraf as a bad guy.  However, mirror-imaging is one of the great errors when it comes to judging the actions of others.

In our country, the check and balances between the three branches of government and an open and free press, no matter how slanted they might be from time to time, are held up as pillars of a free society.  All of that is made possible by the Constitution.  James Madison said, “We have no government armed with power capable of contending with human passions unbridled by morality and religion.  Our constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other.”  That’s why mirror-imaging doesn’t work.

Musharraf won the democratic election in Pakistan.  However the Pakistani Supreme Court refused to acknowledge his victory on the grounds that he is disqualified because he is still wearing a military uniform.  It is interesting that a lot of US media joined the Pakistani media to support the view of the Pakistani Supreme Court, especially when they seem to care so little about Syrian president Bashar Assad who basically inherited his Axis of Evil position or the boisterous outspoken anti-American Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez.  Many US editors prefer to broadcast news that assaults the leaders of governments that are our allies in the Global War on Terrorism.  The American people could fix that quickly by refusing to consume or support the sponsors of so-minded media.  As it is, until the taste of the American people change, those editors will provide news they believe is financially fruitful to them.

In Pakistan, it is not uncommon for courts to order women to be raped as punishment for the crimes of their male relatives.  One bizarre charge against Musharraf is based on his promotion of the Women’s Protection Bill, which would punish the act of rape, instead of using it as punishment against women for being related to criminals.  It is obvious that the Pakistanis are not like Americans.  They need a shepherd with an iron-staff to keep them from following the bad example of the poor company they’ve been associating with.

With enough faith in humanity’s potential, you might see a time when the Pakistani people may morally evolve to the point where their unbridled passions will be suppressed by a changed heart.  However, until that time comes, we can be thankful that they have General Pervez Musharraf in command.

It just makes sense.

The pressure was on.  Before the young Major General could take the podium, the Secretary of the Air Force had some opening words.  Those words included breaking the ages-long tradition of neither confirming nor denying the existence of nuclear weapons.  However, this time it was undeniable.  The basic facts of the embarrassing scandal of temporarily losing a pylon of nuclear missiles confirmed their existence to even the most casual observer.

The seats in front of him were filled with reporters.  Their nonthreatening, inquisitive faces stared up at him as he began.  He looked down at his prepared notes, apparently to make sure he got the facts correct before he spoke.  There could be nothing so serious as to make a faux pas in reporting on this serious event.

His eyes never strayed far from his notes as he said, “Nothing like this has ever happened before.  This was a failure to follow procedures that have proven to be sound.  It involved a limited number of airmen at two bases.  Our extensive six-week investigation found this to be an isolated incident, and that the weapons never left the custody of airmen.  They were never unsecured, but clearly this incident is unacceptable to the people of the United States and to the United States Air Force.  We owe the nation nothing less than adherence to a high standard.  In addition our investigation found that there has been an erosion in adherence to weapons handling standards at Minot Air Force Base and at Barksdale Air Force Base.  We have acted quickly and decisively to rectify this.”

Confident in his prepared notes, he went on to read the details of the event where the weapons were lost, but not really, and then recovered, confirmed the firings of a handful of Colonels and Lt Colonels and the disciplining of an undisclosed number of lower-ranked airmen, and then he discussed the follow-up steps that were being taken.  Before long, he was ready for questions.  He motioned to a reporter near the front.

“My question is about what you meant when you said, ‘in addition,’ what did you mean by that?”

“It means that I was repeating the information that I had just covered.”

“Are you sure?  Because normally when someone says, ‘in addition,’ they are usually adding something to an original list or statement,” the reporter quizzed.

“Hey if I had wanted to add something to the things I had already said, I would have made it clear with the words that I used.  After all, I was reading from my carefully prepared notes.  When I said, ‘in addition,’ I was merely going on to repeat the information that I had said earlier.”

Of course the General didn’t really get asked that silly question.  Therefore he didn’t really say those silly answers; I just joked that he did.  Instead he was asked something much more serious about his opening statement.  However, his response was just as elusive as the silly answers I just joked about.

He was asked by several reporters about what he had meant with his statement about “an erosion in standards.”  Each time he was asked about it, he repeated the first part of his opening statement in slightly modified words.  Mostly to the effect of, “This was an isolated event, with a failure of attention to detail, a failure to follow tech orders, checklists and procedures.  It involved only a limited number of airmen.”

At 7 minutes and 25 seconds into the filmed account of the press release, it only took 8 seconds for General Newton to say, “In addition, our investigation found that there has been an erosion in adherence to weapons handling standards at Minot Air Force Base and at Barksdale Air Force Base.”  He had already covered the data about the “isolated” event, and it was clear to see that he had prepared notes for the briefing.  What does “in addition” mean?

A common man would believe it to mean: There was a serious mistake made, but the Air Force and DoD are handling it.  And in the course of an investigation, it was discovered that something else had happened to degrade the way airmen are following established standards dealing with certain types of weapons.

That “something else” was metaphorically called “erosion,” which everyone knows is something that happens over time due to some catalyst.  For example, wind or water can erode the earth supporting a building, road, or a dam.  Eventually the foundation begins to crumble, small pieces fall away, cracks in the structure appear, then widen, and eventually the entire structure fails.  Small pieces have been falling away from the Air Force for years with little notice.  Was the serious incident a crack appearing or widening?  When is the structural failure coming?

Of course the reporters had questions about that!  However, General Newton retreated into a standard barrage-answer tactic to fend off any of their probing for more information.  The reporters eventually abandoned that line of questioning, but with obvious frustration.

Things that would be nice to know are (1) Who is responsible for the erosion; (2) What started the erosion; (3) When did the erosion begin; (4) Where is the plan to reverse the erosion; and (5) How bad has the erosion become?  Those are the basic who, what, when, where, and how questions that if answered candidly would probably reveal a clothes-line of embarrassing stains that could be the talk of the neighborhood for decades.  And as bad as that would be, it would be even worse to conceal the data and do nothing about it.

Something has happened to the Air Force.  The Air Force used to be very good at adherence to tech orders, checklists, and procedures.  Some time in the past, an erosion of standards began.  That erosion is probably the root cause of the serious incident.  The serious incident is only a symptom of that erosion.  The people fired were, at the most, part of that erosion – not the cause of it.  The cause of the erosion must be identified, targeted, stopped, reversed, and eliminated or other serious incidents are likely to happen in the future.

It just makes sense.

By now, most of you have seen the picture of Obama standing in front of the Flag with his hands clasped in front of him as he casually gazes off to his right.  Behind him are his competing Democratic Party member Presidential candidates striking a typical “hand over the heart” pose, while the National Anthem plays.Snopes.com gives Obama every benefit of the doubt while makes every excuse possible to justify his behavior.  The photo suggest that Obama must have something in his psyche that makes it seem right to him to not even show a modicum of respect for the nation that has given so much for him to live in the comfort he enjoys.  Something indeed.

Is it too much to ask of a Presidential candidate to say the Pledge of Allegiance?

Obama said, “True patriotism is speaking out on issues that are of importance to our national security.”

Webster said, “Patriotism is devoted love, support, and defense of one’s country.”

Obama’s spokesperson did not dispute the photo we’ve all seen, he said, “sometimes he puts his hand on his heart, sometimes he doesn’t.  He wasn’t making a statement, suggesting otherwise is ridiculous.”

Is it ridiculous to expect devoted love, support and defense of the United States by elected officials?

No.

Is it ridiculous to expect devoted love, support and defense of the United States by Presidential candidates?

No.

Is it ridiculous to listen to the excuses given to defend such examples of disregard for all the traditions of Americanism?

Maybe, especially when our nation is involved in a global war against terrorism — with terrorists who have attacked our nation and killed our people — with terrorists whose greatest wish to see all Americans beheaded.

What happened to our standards?

The United States has only a few parallels in history of where our nation has been attacked from outside our borders.  Thus historical examples are difficult to show, but here are a couple:

Most of us remember or have read that the US was also attacked back in 1941 and then we launched into World War II:

How ridiculous would similar behavior to Obama’s have been in 1942?  Could a Presidential candidate have behaved in such a manner without having been pulled off the platform and beaten by the people there?

Some of might have read that the Washington DC was burned by our enemies in 1812, this of course was some of the opening blows of the War of 1812:

How ridiculous would similar behavior to Obama’s have been in 1813?  Could a Presidential candidate have behaved in such a manner without having been pulled off the platform and stoned by the people there?

In 2007, did anyone present even “boo” the candidate?  Was the camera person the only one who noticed?

Hopefully, we’re all taking notice now.

Our current political behavior doesn’t make sense.

I understand that the Democratic Party members want to win elections against the Republicans, but can’t everyone just agree to respect this nation and the symbols of American (such as our Flag, the Anthem, and the Pledge), to be united against the enemies of our nation (less we embolden them to kill more of us), and then to debate the other issues honestly in order to decide the elections?

It Just Makes Sense.